Business email compromise was $3.04B of the $20.8B reported to the FBI's IC3 in 2025. It is rarely the biggest category by count. It is one of the biggest by money, because it targets payments that were going to happen anyway.
The anatomy of a redirected wire
A deal is agreed and a closing date is set. Before payment, the buyer gets an email that looks like the seller, the title company, or the lawyer, with new wire instructions. The buyer sends the money. The only thing that changed is the account number.
Real estate alone was $275.1M in reported wire-fraud losses in 2025. The same pattern shows up in M&A earnest money, equipment, aircraft, vessels, and any large payment waiting on a release date.
Why the money rarely comes back
A Fedwire transfer is final once it settles. That is why wires work for large sums, and why a misdirected one is hard to recover. At an average of $5.28M in 2025, one redirected payment can exceed a mid-sized company's annual fraud budget.
Where controls actually work
Training helps, but the attack is built to pass a careful reader. The controls that hold up remove the step the fraud needs: someone typing new payment details from a message.
Verify the counterparty before money moves. Link bank accounts directly, so routing details are never retyped from an email. Tie release to conditions both sides agreed, with a named approver, so a last-minute change of instructions has nowhere to land.
Fraud is still possible. The decision moves out of the inbox, which is where these losses start.